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Abstract 
 
From the earliest days of video game studies as a field, and before - with discussions of virtual 
reality - a debate has endured over the nature of virtual embodiment. From Janet Murray’s Hamlet 
on the Holodeck in 1997, to Edward Castronova’s foundational examination of the phenomenon 
of MMOGs, to Valtin, Pietschmann, Liebold, and Ohler’s examination of online social immersion 
in 2014, the concern over how embodiment is configured in virtual spaces is ongoing. Further, 
questions of whether such embodiment is possible, and if the experience should be called 
‘embodiment’, continue to be omnipresent. Several of the theories put forth about virtual 
embodiment are, at best, not fully explored or followed through to their logical conclusion. At 
worst, some of these theories paint a troubling, dehumanizing picture of the perception of virtual 
embodiment and the player/avatar relationship. The continued focus on the phenomenology of the 
experience is understandable, however, as the synthesis of player/user and in-game avatar is the 
locus of most, if not all, video game and virtual environment experiences. 
Engaging with theories of virtual identity, gender, the player/avatar relationship during gameplay, 
and the often embattled juxtaposition of narrative and gameplay in video games, this paper 
explores the ways in which avatars are both characters and embodied experiences. This 
examination addresses ideas of the avatar as vehicle, the avatar as narrative character, and the 
avatar as cybernetic embodiment, and strives to find a synthesis between them, in order to come 
to terms with the unique structure of the player’s interactions with the virtual experience. 
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Introduction 
 
Video games, almost without exception, provide the player with an avatar in order to navigate the 
experiences on offer. Spacewar! (Steve Russell, 1962), for example, places the player in control 
of a spaceship resembling those from the pulps and comics of the 1930s. Any first-person shooter 
provides, at the very least, an avatar’s hands through which to interact (read: shoot at) with the 
world on offer, as can be seen from Wolfenstein 3D‘s BJ Blazkowicz (id Software, 1992), to Half-
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Life’s Gordon Freeman (Valve, 1998), to the multiple soldiers in any given entry in the Call of 
Duty series (Activision, 2003-present). Even abstract games offer a form of avatar interaction, 
albeit equally abstract. Pong (Atari, 1972) provides ‘paddles’ - solid white rectangles - as players’ 
representatives in the game space. The player is represented in the game space of Tetris (Alexy 
Pajitnov, 1984) by the tetraminos themselves, as they turn, speed up, slow down, and move left 
and right by the player’s input. 
Tied to these avatars is the notion of ‘virtual embodiment’ – the notion that a player can inhabit 
these avatars on a phenomenological level. What is meant by ‘phenomenological level’ is the 
immediate, in-the-moment, sense-experience tying body and mind together defined by Merleau-
Ponty (1958), brought into the realm of video games by way of experiencing physical bodily 
reactions to virtual events and actions. From the earliest days of video game studies as a field and 
before - with discussions of virtual reality - a debate has endured over the nature of virtual 
embodiment. Janet Murray’s (1997) foundational text Hamlet on the Holodeck, offered a definition 
of immersion which serves equally well for virtual embodiment:  
[T]he sensation of being surrounded by a completely other reality, as different 
as water is from air, that takes over all of our attention, our whole perceptual 
awareness. We enjoy the movement out of our familiar world, the feeling of 
alertness that comes from being in this new place, and the delight that comes 
from learning to move within it. [Italics added for emphasis]  
p. 98 (1997)  
Extrapolating from this definition, virtual embodiment entails the bodily reactions and sensations 
which come from this digital immersion. The nature of this dynamic is one which is continually 
explored, from Edward Castronova’s (2005) foundational examination of the phenomenon of 
MMOGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Games), in which he likens the avatar to a prosthetic, to 
Valtin, Pietschmann, Liebold, and Ohler’s (2014) examination of online social immersion, to 
Ratan and June Sah’s (2015) research on avatar customization and stereotype threat, the concern 
over how embodiment is configured in virtual spaces is ongoing.  
Further, questions of whether such embodiment is possible, and if the experience should be called 
‘embodiment’, continue to be at the forefront of the discussion, either explicitly or through 
implication. Several of the theories put forth about virtual embodiment are, at best, not fully 
explored or followed through to their logical conclusion. At worst, some of these theories paint a 
troubling, dehumanizing picture of the perception of virtual embodiment and the player/avatar 
relationship, turning human characters into mere objects; more specifically, and most commonly, 
vehicles the player ‘drives’ through the virtual landscape. The continued focus on the 
phenomenology of the experience is understandable, however. The synthesis of player/user and 
in-game avatar is the locus of most, if not all, video game and virtual environment experiences. 
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In the Driver’s Seat 
In order to discuss ways of conceptualizing virtual embodiment, it is important to examine the 
problematics present in various theories of the player/avatar relationship. James Newman (2002) 
encapsulates the more concerning side of the conception of the player/avatar synthesis in his article 
The Myth of the Ergodic Videogame. Newman prefaces his discussion with the ambiguous 
assertion that “the “character” is better considered as a suite of characteristics or equipment utilized 
and embodied by the controlling player (Ibid). Newman’s conceptions of player-characters are 
already troubling, as they break down what is essentially an embodied representation (the avatar) 
into a series of functions. Yet Newman does acknowledge in this statement that this series of 
functions is embodied by the player. This acknowledgement suggests that Newman does, in fact, 
consider virtual embodiment not only possible, but a necessary and inherent part of the 
player/avatar experience. 
The larger problem comes to the fore, however, when Newman elaborates on his theory of how 
the player/avatar relationship functions. Further to suggesting that the embodied avatar in the 
gaming experience is reducible to a toolset, Newman puts forth the following: 
They are vehicles. This is easier to come to terms with when we think of a 
racing game like Gran Turismo where we drive a literal vehicle, but I am 
suggesting that, despite their representational traits, we can think of all 
videogame characters in this manner. On-line, Lara Croft is defined less by 
appearance than by the fact that “she” allows the player to jump distance x, 
while the ravine in front of us is larger than that, so we better start thinking of 
a new way round…  
(Ibid)  
By this reasoning, and almost articulated by Newman, a character like Lara Croft (from the Tomb 
Raider series) is directly equivalent to a Honda Civic or a Mazda 3, either in Newman’s Gran 
Turismo example, or in terms of the real-world cars. In other words, both literal vehicle and in-
game avatar can be viewed simply as an apparatus by which the user can travel and perform certain 
functions, and nothing more. 
Setting aside arguments about the personalities with which real-world vehicles may be imbued by 
both manufacturers and owners, there are several issues present in Newman’s conception. The first 
concern is the fact that Newman attributes the same level of ‘vehicle-ness’ to both a real-world car 
and the ones in Gran Turismo. In addition to the fact that the experience is inherently different due 
to remediation, racing games such as Gran Turismo are most commonly played from the third-
person perspective. What play from this perspective means is that the virtual cars already have 
virtual drivers. The player does not inhabit the car – the player inhabits the car’s driver, thus 
leading to another form of the player/avatar synthesis embedded in the experience of playing as a 
human avatar.  
Further, as gaming hardware has improved, these drivers have not remained as mere implication. 
At the time of Newman’s article, windshields in racing games remained opaque, because the 
hardware running these games was incapable of rendering explicit driver models within the cars 
(see Figure 1). This lack of visibility appears to perpetuate Newman’s theory of the player 
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inhabiting the vehicles themselves, as the appearance given is that of the player directly controlling 
the vehicle with no mediating human avatar. With more powerful hardware, as illustrated in games 
such as Forza Motorsport 5 (Microsoft Studios, 2013) and Gran Turismo 5 (Sony Computer 
Entertainment, 2010), the drivers of each vehicle are clearly visible, and react to the player’s inputs 
along with the car being driven (see Figure 2). That games in long-running series like Forza and 
Gran Turismo have both included these drivers indicates that their presence was always, if not 
overt, implicit throughout. 
 
	
Figure 1 - Gran Turismo (Sony Computer Entertainment, 1998) 		
	
Figure 2 - Gran Turismo 5 (Sony Computer Entertainment, 2010) 
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The Character of Characters 
The larger issue present in Newman’s argument is that, if Lara Croft is simply a vehicle when 
controlled by the player, then Croft’s individual personality, traits, and embodied existence 
separate from the player carry no significance – Lara Croft as a person/subjecthood does not 
matter. This author has already written on how this dynamic in Newman’s theory is not, and 
cannot, be the case. Even if an avatar were to be viewed simply as a set of abilities, those abilities 
would be dictated and determined by the personality and past experiences of the character. Because 
the nature of the character informs the abilities available to the player, the avatar as an autonomous 
character, with his/her own experiences and personality, is immediately and inherently rendered 
of extreme importance to the gameplay experience (Alton, 2012).  
This notion of the avatar as autonomous character is made explicit to the player in the form of idle 
animations – animations that occur if the player does not input a command within a sufficient time 
window. While the player needs to take control in order to progress the game, there are numerous 
examples of avatars expressing their personality independent of the player’s input throughout 
gaming history. Examples include Lara Croft dusting herself off and kicking dirt from her heels in 
the Tomb Raider series; Donatello playing air guitar with his bo in Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles 
IV: Turtles in Time (Konami, 1992); the various Marvel comics characters performing little 
character-specific and character-defining actions (for example, Iron Man lifting his visor to allow 
Tony Stark’s face to be visible) in Lego Marvel Super Heroes (Traveler’s Tales, 2014). These idle 
animations all establish that these are characters separate from the player who are working together 
with the player to complete the goals of the game. The most extreme example of this dynamic is 
Sega’s Sonic the Hedgehog. From his first game forward, if left idle, Sonic will tap his foot and 
check his watch, impatiently waiting for the player to start playing again (Sonic the Hedgehog, 
Sega, 1991). In Sonic CD (Sega, 1993), Sonic will, if left too long, leap from the screen ending the 
player’s game entirely. The character, tired of waiting for the player, simply terminates the 
conditions for play because of his impatient personality. 
In addition, the avatar’s characterization is explicitly made known to the player through various 
channels before Newman’s ‘on-line’ play takes place. Using Newman’s example of Lara Croft, 
the game’s box art cues the player into the fact that “Your mission is the deadliest one to date” 
(Tomb Raider box art, 1996), an indication that the events of the game would not be Croft’s first 
death-defying expedition, further cemented by the mere title of the game – Tomb Raider. 
Moreover, the first thing the player is presented with in reading the manual is a 
backstory/biography for the character. This introductory backstory details Croft’s aristocratic 
lineage and upbringing, her near-death experience which awakened her to her tomb-raiding ways, 
her disavowal by her parents due to clashing ideologies, her multiple publications on her 
adventures, and her deep-rooted love of archaeology (Tomb Raider instruction manual, 1996).  
Even a so-called ‘blank slate’ character like Half-Life’s Gordon Freeman is nothing of the sort.  
During the opening of Half-Life, the player is, while still able to look around as Freeman, enclosed 
in an underground tram car for the first five minutes of the game, unable to move around. During 
this time, the Black Mesa research facility is explained in visual short-hand, through quick views 
of labs, industrial areas, military vehicles and weaponry, and what appears to be toxic waste. As 
well, cues are offered by the automated message playing in the tram, such as notes on security 
clearances, the dangers of radiation poisoning, and non-disclosure.  
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All of these more subtle pieces of character priming are bolstered by the overt heads-up print out 
during the ride. This print-out details Freeman’s name, sex, and age; his PhD in Theoretical physics 
from MIT; his position as research associate; his assignment to the anomalous materials lab; his 
security clearance level; his administrative sponsor (which is classified); and his disaster response 
priority (Half-Life, 1998). In the space of five minutes, Freeman’s essential backstory is laid out 
for the player before they can even take one step in his shoes, as it were. This exposition does not 
even take into account the game’s box, which, while written in second-person, establishes 
Freeman’s position as experimental scientist and offers the only image of Freeman, illustrating 
him as a brown-haired white male with a goatee (but, interestingly enough, no glasses) (Half-Life 
box art, 1998). This is all to say that, while Freeman does not talk and his hands are gloved, 
allowing for players to picture their own ethnicity for him, his history and characteristics are laid 
out for the player from the outset, establishing him as a distinct character from the player and not 
the blank slate he is touted as being. 
As such, any potential embodiment experienced by the player is experienced in a way that calls to 
mind Lacan’s mirror stage theory of identification, as illustrated by Laurie Taylor (2003). Taylor’s 
article discusses the fracturing of experience when the player sees the avatar, or, more precisely, 
the avatar’s reflection, from a first-person perspective during gameplay (see Figure 3) (Ibid). 
Taylor’s argument makes sense from a purely Lacanian perspective, but, as will be discussed later, 
the phenomenology of the player/avatar experience actually recovers the schism she highlights. 
 
	
Figure 3 - Duke Nukem looking in a mirror in Duke Nukem 3D (3D Worlds, 1996) 
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The Subject Objectified 
Returning to Newman’s view of avatar-as-vehicle, this perspective further serves to negate any 
progressive possibilities, such as explorations of gender identity/discussion and ethnic diversity, 
inherent in the avatar as embodied presence. In Helen Kennedy’s work on Lara Croft as both 
problematic and laden with potential, she states the following: 
Thus, in this complex relationship between subject [as individual] and object 
[of desire] it could be argued that having to play through Tomb Raider as 
Lara, a male player is transgendered: the distinctions between the player and 
the game character are blurred. One potential way of exploring this 
transgendering is to consider the fusion of player and game character as a kind 
of queer embodiment, a merger of the flesh of the (male) player with Lara’s 
elaborated feminine body of pure information. This new queer identity 
potentially subverts stable distinctions between identification and desire and 
also by extension the secure and heavily defended polarities of masculine and 
feminine subjectivity.  
(2002) 
This potential for a queering experience (which Kennedy recognizes as problematic, considering 
the character’s overtly intentional design catering to the male gaze) is rendered moot, if Newman’s 
argument is correct. If Lara Croft is simply reducible to the ability to jump, climb, and shoot 
offered up to the player, without the female embodiment that makes her Kennedy’s subject and 
object, then the subjectivity – and thus the potential queering experience – are lost, leaving the 
play experience as empty navigation. 
That Newman himself acknowledges the embodiment occurring in the player/avatar relationship 
means that this queering potential may still exist, which, by extension, means that Lara Croft as 
character is more important than Newman gives her, or any avatar, credit for. To highlight the 
issue further, Newman’s conception of Lara Croft as nothing more than vehicle is illustrated and 
critiqued in Peggy Ahwesh’s She-Puppet (2001)1. In her video piece, Ahwesh re-edits several 
sequences of gameplay from the early games in the Tomb Raider series, including the many deaths 
that Lara Croft experiences in the course of gameplay, removing context for each sequence in the 
process. While addressing the same cultural problematics of the character that Kennedy mentions, 
Ahwesh also draws attention to one of the major concerns in the avatar-as-vehicle argument. 
Removing all reference to the character as such, and showing Croft solely as a fetishized object 
highlights the inherent misogyny present in assuming that Lara Croft, as a female character, is just 
an object to be controlled by the player. In reducing Croft or any avatar to the equivalent of a car, 
or, perhaps more accurately as illustrated  by the Half-Life example mentioned, a roller coaster car, 
any agency/subjectivity inherent to the human avatar, and therefore any potentially progressive 
aspects of the play experience, are minimized to the point of non-existence, as well. 
Perhaps most concerning about this perspective is how widespread it appears to be. Edward 
Castronova (2005), in his foundational work on MMOGs, Synthetic Worlds, articulates a 
surprisingly similar concept of the player/avatar relationship, while also unintentionally 
highlighting precisely why it is so troubled. In discussing player-controlled characters in these 
online spaces, Castronova states the following: 
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[T]he avatar’s attributes felt like they were your own personal attributes. This 
step appears to be psychologically natural, because the avatar is an extension 
of your body in a new space. The body is the tool by which the mind receives 
sensation and manipulates the environment, and this avatar body does exactly 
and only that. And it makes sense to think of it as your body, just as someone 
with a prosthetic arm should think of it as his arm. Coming to own the avatar, 
psychologically, is so natural among those who spend time in synthetic 
worlds that it is barely noticed. No one ever says, “My character’s strength is 
depleted,” or, “My avatar owns a dune buggy.” They say “my strength” and 
“my dune buggy”. [Italics in original] 
p. 45 (2005) 
It is clear that Castronova views player-characters as akin to Newman’s vehicles, likening them to 
tools or prosthetics allowing for interaction within virtual environments.  
This view reduces the investment that players have put forth in making sure that their unique 
characters are imbued with distinct personalities and abilities which reflect those choices. As well, 
the efforts and intentions of the developers to give options which allow for such investment to take 
place, for good or ill as pointed out by T.L. Taylor (2003), are also minimized. In fact, rather than 
problematizing player investment, Taylor’s discussion of the technical, economic, and value 
constraints built into MMOs by developers highlights players’ willingness to work through or 
around these restrictions to make the characters their own (p. 27). This is not a dismissal of the 
issues raised by Taylor, which are still prevalent, under-examined, and need wider address in the 
industry; it is simply a recognition that players and developers may have different intentions for 
avatars, both of which Castronova sidelines. 
Further, the idea that these avatars, which many players go to great lengths to cultivate as 
characters independent of their real-world selves, and despite the players’ making the choices for 
them, are simply tools or vehicles negates Sherry Turkle’s findings on player experiences in online 
spaces. Turkle’s Life on the Screen (1995) illustrates that players wind up inhabiting the 
personalities of these characters, causing a synthesis of the two, allowing players to experience 
different identities. Further, Turkle, as does Castronova, discusses the real-world impact of playing 
in these online arenas. Turkle, however, discusses how experimenting with these identities allows 
for exploration of aspects of one’s identity in offline realms, and adoption of traits enacted online 
(Ibid).  
Bessière, Seay, and Kiesler (2007) take this notion one step further, testing the notion of the avatar 
as an ideal self, rather than as a separate identity. Their study concluded that not only do players 
interact with their avatars as ideal versions of themselves, but that this ideal self actually has a 
positive impact on both depressive affect and self-esteem offline (p.7). These beneficial findings 
are mitigated by Ratan and Young Sah’s (2015) study, while still illustrating the strong attachment 
of players to their avatars. In their research, Ratan and Young Sah found that players who used a 
female avatar were more likely to underperform in a math problem-solving competition in which 
females were the minority of competitors, regardless of the player’s declared offline gender (p. 
368). This finding is consistent with stereotype threat, which is, as Ratan and Young Sah explain, 
“that when people are made aware of negative stereotypes relating to their relevant social groups, 
they tend to perform worse at tasks implicated in the stereotype” (p. 368). These areas of synthesis 
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suggest not the operation of a vehicle or the use of a tool, but the creation of a character with a 
personality and an expression of empathy by way of a shared experience, for better or worse.  
Castronova’s description of the player/avatar experience is illuminating in one respect, however. 
In his discussion, Castronova makes explicit what is only implied in Newman’s article: a Cartesian 
bias. Castronova discusses how the body is simply a tool operated by the mind, enforcing the 
Cartesian body/mind divide and precluding the Merleau-Pontean body/mind fusion, or synthesis. 
This stance, along with the conception of the player-avatar specifically as prosthesis, is doubly 
problematic. On the one hand, it ignores the psychological importance of the player being able to 
experiment with different or ideal identities and aspects of personality, as both Turkle and Bessiere 
et al highlight. On the other hand, it negates the very real issues, experiences of and biases toward, 
people who require prosthetics, as well as the psychological concerns raised by Ratan and Young 
Sah. 
 
Making a Connection 
Taking this body/mind synthesis notion further, if the body and mind are indivisible, then a virtual 
body would, once player/avatar synthesis occurs, become an extension of this same principle. As 
Andreas Gregersen and Torbal Grodal state in their article, Embodiment and Interface: 
[W]e would argue that interacting with video games may lead to a sense of 
extended embodiment and sense of agency that lies somewhere between the 
two poles of schema and image – it is an embodied awareness in the moment 
of action, a kind of body image in action – where one experiences both agency 
and ownership of virtual entities. This process is a fusion of player’s 
intentions, perceptions, and actions. Once the player stops acting in relation 
to the game system and pays conscious attention to his or her own 
embodiment, this effect subsides in favor of a more regular body image. 
[Italics in original] 
p. 67 (2009)  
This theory of embodiment not only allows for the experience which Castronova describes while 
dismissing the Cartesian body/mind divide, it also incorporates a wider theory of engaged 
embodiment.  
Csikszentmihalyi (2008) discusses how a person engaged in a pleasurable, challenging activity 
will enter a state of ‘flow’, in which the outside world, in terms of both space and time, recedes 
into the background of perception, and the task consumes the person’s awareness in a pleasurable 
manner. In this regard, the player, as discussed by Gregersen and Torbold (2009), would enter into 
this virtual embodiment by way of Csikszentmihalyi’s flow state and only re-inhabit the original 
body image when that state of flow is interrupted, either through external stimulus or internal focus 
shifts. 
Given this flow-state virtual embodiment, the question then becomes one of entry. If the player 
enters into this embodied awareness by way of entering the flow state, the catalyst for this state 
remains to be determined. Here, again, the narrative aspects of the player/avatar relationship come 
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into play. Andrew Burn (2006) puts forth an interesting, if not fully progressed, theory for this 
opening to engagement, and thus embodiment. Burn identifies the same pronoun blurring that 
Castronova has illustrated, but attributes the phenomenon to a different, more narratological cause. 
Instead of seeing the avatar as tool or vehicle, Burn sees the avatar as protagonist in the oral 
tradition (p. 78-79).  
Invoking Walter Ong’s concept of the second orality, Burn contends that the experience of playing 
as an avatar causes the player to engage in the experience as both audience member, in that she/he 
is partaking of a narrative already constructed, and author, in that the only way for that narrative 
to be fulfilled is through the player’s dynamic actions via avatar (p. 87). This idea is reiterated in 
Egenfeldt Nielsen, Heide Smith, and Pajares Tosca’s Understanding Video Games (2007). In their 
discussion of narrative, these authors state the following: “[t]he key to a successful mechanics is 
to make players feel that they are contributing to creating a plot; the most successful narrative 
experiences happen in games where our actions have noticeable plot consequences” (p. 183).  
While this theory may at first blush offer the solution to how virtual embodiment is initiated, there 
are some flaws inherent in this conception which are a result of the interactive nature of the 
medium. While not dismissing the importance of narrative in the gameplay experience, Burn’s 
(2006) positioning of the player as both audience and author still implies both a linearity and a 
sense of detachment to the act of play. Even with the improvisation and audience input inherent to 
the oral tradition, which Burn asserts are incorporated and remediated technologically in the 
gameplay experience (p. 87), the position of the subject is still that of an outsider – the subject and 
the protagonist of the narrative do not directly coincide. 
Diane Carr perhaps expresses this concern best when addressing the ways in which players 
embody real-world reactions to in-game events. In her article, Space, Navigation, and Affect, she 
states: 
Certain kinds of recognition or ‘identification’ – this would suggest – do exist 
between the player and avatar. Game analysts cannot explain such phenomena 
simply by applying models of cinematic identification. Theories of cinematic 
identification were developed using models drawn from psychoanalysis, and 
the film spectator’s stillness in front of the screen is a central premise. The 
player’s relationship to on-screen events and bodies, by contrast, is dependent 
on the user taking action, and any theory of ‘ergodic identification’ would 
have to allow for this. Additionally, games position and address their players 
through various perspectives, modes, channels, menus, inputs, and outputs. 
This suggests that it would be a mistake to try to impose a single model on to 
all avatar-player relations.  
(Carr, 2006, p. 68) 
As Carr states, most theories of media identification assume an essentially passive consumer as 
subject (setting aside reader response theory for the moment). As the player is actively 
contributing, not only to the understanding of the game’s narrative, but to its advancement in a 
way not replicable in other, more traditional, forms of media, the logical extension is that older 
media theory cannot properly express the dynamics in play. 
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Taking Centre Stage 
Interestingly, Carr notes a similar phenomenon to Burn and Castronova’s pronoun blurring which 
helps to direct the discussion toward a potential answer. As Carr states, “All	players,	surely,	have	found	themselves	flinching	when	an	avatar	bangs	its	head,	have	felt	themselves	lean	over	with	pseudo-centrifugal	forces	or	recoil	when	an	avatar	plunges	over	a	cliff”	(p.	68).	Carr	is	not	 the	 only	 one	 to	 note	 this	 phenomenon,	 as	 Gregersen and Torbold (2009), as well as 
Manovich (2001), comment on similar examples. What this behaviour on the part of the player 
indicates is twofold. First, it reaffirms the theory put forth by Gregersen and Torbold, reinforced 
by Csikszentmihalyi. Second, it illustrates a performance on the part of the player, separate from 
the inputs necessary to playing the game. 
From this notion, the idea can be extended that, rather than being an extension of the oral tradition, 
as per Burn, the virtual embodiment of the player/avatar relationship can instead be identified with 
a modified form of theatrical performance. To be sure, the language of theatre and performance is 
present in several of these discussions on virtual embodiment. Burn (2006) repeatedly refers to the 
player as an actor when actively taking control of the experience; Manovich discusses the virtual 
in terms of movement on a stage (2001); even Murray’s (1997) early text invokes a Shakespeare 
play, to be experienced instead of simply watched or read. In fact, the title of Burn’s article 
expressly states that the user is playing a role, a thread that Burn leaves to the side in favour of his 
oral tradition theory.  
Taking the perspective of the player inhabiting a role explains several of the qualms/issues 
expressed in other theories. Returning to Laurie Taylor’s Lacanian critique of the first-person 
perspective in video games, the player, more often than not, does not experience the schism Taylor 
assumes. If the notion stands that the player is inhabiting the role of the protagonist from this first-
person perspective as a performance, then the inherent difference and otherness of suddenly seeing 
a reflection not one’s own during a first-person play session makes sense - that reflection both is 
and is not the player’s own, as it is that of the role currently being inhabited. 
Frameworks for approaching game play as performance, rather than Burn’s oral tradition, have 
already been conceptualized. Clara Fernandez Vara (2009) lays out the ways in which both digital 
and analogue games may be seen through a theatrical lens. In her discussion, Fernandez Vara 
parallels Burn’s notion of the synthesis between actor and audience, but her conception replaces 
the oral poet of Burn’s discussion with the actor on-stage during a play (p. 6). In addition, she 
offers a tri-partite framework by which such a performance may be conceptualized. The game’s 
code/mechanics stand in the place of the theatre play’s script (p. 5). The runtime/dynamics parallel 
the theatre’s performance time, in terms of both length of the show and time periods internal to the 
narrative, as well as the actual unfolding of the plot/events (Ibid).  Finally, the player’s interaction, 
and the aesthetics produced through this interaction, is equivalent to the symbiosis, or mise-en-
scene in her terms, of audience and theatrical performance (p. 5).  
This idea of performance also allows for the variation and improvisation which Burn attributes to 
the oral tradition. No two theatrical performances are identical, and theatrical actors move through 
a pre-set narrative (the play itself, or Fernandez Vara’s code/mechanics) while also contributing 
their own actions and expression through their embodiment of the roles being played and the 
choices made as a result. Further, online embodiment may be seen as improvisational theatre 
performance. The players are given bare frameworks, in the form of quests, back-story, and so on, 
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and the players themselves improvise the proceedings based on their characters’ interactions with 
each other and the world they inhabit. 
To be sure, the notion of theatrical/improvisational performance alone would not suffice to 
describe in full the player/avatar relationship or the phenomenon of virtual embodiment, as 
indicated by Carr. What this perspective does offer is the entryway into the embodied experience, 
as well as a reconciliation of the fracturing of perception indicated by Taylor. That these theories, 
as well as several aspects of Burn’s conception, remain relevant is testimony to the fact that video 
games are a unique medium to which previous media theories do not wholly apply. 
Interestingly, video game developers themselves have recognized the phenomenon of both player 
performance and virtual embodiment, and incorporated them into their games. In UbiSoft’s 
Assassin’s Creed series (2007-present), the main conceit of the game is that the modern-day 
protagonist is able to share in the experiences of his ancestors by way of technological mediation 
in the form of a device dubbed the animus. Not only is the modern-day protagonist sharing in these 
experiences, but he is doing so in a way that both allows for variations based on his own, and thus 
the player’s, improvisations, as well as offering an embodied experience.  
The way in which the games highlight the player/avatar synthesis via this narrative structure 
extends beyond simply the modern-day protagonist’s mirroring of the experience of play. When 
players control the modern-day protagonist as an avatar, it is without the assistance of the animus; 
as such, there is a lack of on-screen extra-diagetic information. Once the modern-day protagonist 
utilizes the animus, they, and by extension the player, are fed data additional to the direct 
environment by way of on-screen displays provided by the animus/game. 
Several other games have incorporated the virtual embodiment experience as part of gameplay, as 
well. In Fez (Polytron, 2012), for example, the avatar is the only character in the game world who 
is capable of seeing objects in three dimensions. This conceit not only draws attention to the 
mediation inherent in the use of a screen to interact with the game (by necessity, all of the objects 
are viewed in two dimensions), but also with the player’s engagement and embodiment with the 
avatar in the movement from a 2D perception (prior to Gregersen and Torbold’s state of virtual 
embodiment) to a perception of 3D space (as the player/avatar synthesis occurs, and virtual 
embodiment takes place, essentially leaving the screen behind in favour of the virtual 
environment).  
As it is addressed by the academic community and the developers of these games, virtual 
embodiment as an actual phenomenon is widely recognized and is deserving of the moniker. The 
processes by which this virtual embodiment occurs, both psychologically and in terms of media 
studies, are less easily defined, and it is the hope of this author that they continue to be examined. 
This article is not intended to be a final conclusion to the debate; instead, it is hoped that this 
discussion will spur further thought into exactly how virtual embodiment takes place, both in terms 
of single players and in the realm of online spaces. 
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